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TAKING PLEA BARGAINING SERIOUSLY: REFORMING  
PRE-SENTENCE REPORTS AFTER PADILLA V. KENTUCKY 
GABRIEL J. CHIN* 
INTRODUCTION 
As the work of Stephanos Bibas has shown, criminal procedure as a whole 
has failed to adjust to meet the imperatives of a system in which almost all 
convictions are obtained by plea rather than through a trial.1  The Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in Padilla v. Kentucky2 may mark the beginning of a 
change in constitutional law to account for the current realities.  In Padilla, the 
Court held that defense counsel must advise clients of the possibility that a plea 
may lead to deportation.3  Though technically not a criminal consequence, 
deportation is critically important to many individuals choosing whether to 
plead guilty. 
Lack of information about deportation is hardly the only discontent 
associated with the plea process.  Inspired by Padilla’s recognition that the 
current system offered inadequate information, this Article explores how one 
important feature of the plea process, the pre-sentence report (hereinafter 
“PSR”), should evolve to be more useful in a plea-based criminal justice 
system.4 
 
* Professor of Law, University of California-Davis School of Law.  Thanks for helpful comments 
to Stephanos Bibas, Douglas Burris, Laura Conover, Tigran Eldred, Dillon Fishman, Margy 
Love, Justin Marceau, Eric Miller, Marc Miller, Hank Shea, Ric Simmons, and Maureen 
Sweeney.  The views expressed within are solely those of the author, gchin@aya.yale.edu. 
 1. E.g., Stephanos Bibas, The Myth of the Fully Informed Rational Actor, 31 ST. LOUIS U. 
PUB. L. REV. 79 (2011); Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 2463 (2004) [hereinafter Bibas, Shadow of Trial]; Stephanos Bibas, Regulating 
the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 
1117 (2011) [hereinafter Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market]. 
 2. 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). 
 3. Id. at 1486. 
 4. For general background on the PSR, see Nancy Glass, The Social Workers of 
Sentencing? Probation Officers, Discretion, and the Accuracy of Presentence Reports Under the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 46 CRIM. L. BULL. 21 (2010); Gregory W. Carman & Tamar 
Harutunian, Fairness at the Time of Sentencing: The Accuracy of the Presentence Report, 78 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 1 (2004); Gary M. Maveal, Federal Presentence Reports: Multi-Tasking at 
Sentencing, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 544 (1996). 
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This Article proposes two changes.  First, the PSR, or at least major parts 
of it, should be prepared before, rather than after, the guilty plea.  Prior to the 
plea, the PSR will enable both the prosecution and the defendant to understand 
the actual sentencing range.  Knowledge of the information upon which the 
sentence will be based, particularly the defendant’s actual criminal record, 
benefits both parties and will produce plea bargains which are more knowing 
and informed. 
The second proposed reform is in the area of collateral consequences, 
which are consequences of the plea other than the sentence itself.  In addition 
to whatever arguments might be advanced in support of advising defendants of 
collateral consequences as a matter of fairness, there is a strong argument from 
the perspective of sentencing policy.5  Many felony convictions are associated 
with months or years of some form of non-custodial supervision, such as 
probation in lieu of incarceration or supervised release following 
incarceration.6  These forms of supervision generally require a person to work 
and pay restitution, as well as obey all federal, state, and local laws.7  
Accordingly, PSRs must include information relevant to a defendant’s 
financial status and earning capacity, as well as the particular legal constraints 
to which a defendant is subject.  Yet, PSRs and the terms of probation and 
supervised release given as part of the sentencing process routinely do not 
include collateral consequences relevant to employment or a general canvass 
of lesser-known legal restrictions on an individual resulting from the 
conviction at issue.  In order to achieve the existing statutory goals of 
sentencing, relevant collateral consequences should be included in a PSR. 
I.  A PSR IN ADVANCE OF THE PLEA 
A. The Unavailability of PSRs at the Time of the Plea Leads to Surprises at 
Sentencing 
In the federal system, pre-sentence investigations and reports were part of 
the original Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, adopted in 1944.8  The 
 
 5. See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND 
DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS Standard 19-2.3(a) (3d. 2004) 
(“The rules of procedure should require a court to ensure, before accepting a plea of guilty, that 
the defendant has been informed of collateral sanctions made applicable to the offense or offenses 
of conviction under the law of the state or territory where the prosecution is pending, and under 
federal law.”); UNIF. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT § 5 cmt. (2010). 
 6. See 18 U.S.C. § 3561 (2006). 
 7. Id. § 3563. 
 8. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2) (1946) (“The report of the presentence investigation shall 
contain any prior criminal record of the defendant and such information about his characteristics, 
his financial condition and the circumstances affecting his behavior as may be helpful in 
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significance of plea bargaining in the criminal justice system was almost 
entirely different before and during the World War II era.9  There were fewer 
criminal cases, of course, but more fundamentally, many more convictions 
resulted from trials rather than plea bargains.10  This meant that the focus in 
criminal cases was appropriately on the underlying facts rather than on facts 
primarily relevant to the sentence.  Also, consideration of the sentence could 
be postponed until after trial because an acquittal would render a PSR 
unnecessary.  In addition, sentences were largely subject to the discretion of 
the court.11  Now, most convictions are obtained by plea, and statutory 
mandatory minimum sentences and “advisory,” but still influential, guidelines 
affect the discretion of judges.12 
By federal statute and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a PSR 
must normally be prepared before sentencing.13  Routinely, this is done after 
acceptance of a guilty plea or conviction at trial.14  In a plea agreement, the 
defendant typically agrees to be bound by the findings of the sentencing 
court.15  The sentencing court, in turn, typically relies on the facts of the case 
and defendant’s criminal history as set out in the PSR.16  Because the PSR 
follows the defendant to the Bureau of Prisons, it is “the critical document at 
both the sentencing and the correctional stages of the criminal process.”17  The 
PSR’s unavailability at the time of the plea means that the most portentous 
decision in the criminal case—to accept a guilty plea to a particular set of 
charges or to go to trial—is made without the benefit of some of the most 
important facts. 
 
imposing sentence or in granting probation or in the correctional treatment of the defendant, and 
such other information as may be required by the Court.”). 
 9. See Candace McCoy, Plea Bargaining as Coercion: The Trial Penalty and Plea 
Bargaining Reform, CRIM. L. QUARTERLY, Apr. 2005, at 67, 73–74. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 82. 
 12. Bibas, Shadow of Trial, supra note 1, at 2487. 
 13. 18 U.S.C. § 3552(a) (2006); FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(1)(A).  This Article is based 
primarily on federal law, not because federal law is unique, but, rather, because it is a reasonably 
representative system.  As I understand it, many state systems work largely the same way, in their 
regular reliance on PSRs, and therefore, the arguments in this Article are applicable to those state 
systems as well. 
 14. In the original rules, disclosure of the report before a plea or guilty verdict was 
prohibited.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(1) (1946). 
 15. See, e.g., plea agreements cited infra notes 22–23. 
 16. Stephen A. Fennell & William N. Hall, Due Process at Sentencing: An Empirical and 
Legal Analysis of the Disclosure of Presentence Reports in Federal Courts, 93 HARV. L. REV. 
1613, 1616 (1980). 
 17. Id. 
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Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C), allowing parties to 
stipulate to the application or non-application of sentencing factors,18 could 
solve the problem.  The parties could stipulate to criminal history and other 
factors, and if the court accepts the plea, the stipulation would be binding.  
However, the prosecution must first be willing to stipulate, which they may 
hesitate to do in the absence of a PSR.19  In addition, the court may accept or 
reject the stipulation or “defer a decision until the court has reviewed the 
presentence report.”20  The Sentencing Commission’s commentary disfavors 
early acceptance: “Given that a presentence report normally will be prepared, 
the Commission recommends that the court defer acceptance of the plea 
agreement until the court has reviewed the presentence report.”21  Accordingly, 
courts following the Sentencing Commission’s recommendation may wait until 
they have reliable data and reject a plea if the stipulated facts are inconsistent 
with the PSR.  Thus, where possible, a stipulation pursuant to Rule 11 offers 
the defendant certainty, but in many cases, it will not be available. 
Currently, this informational uncertainty is frequently resolved by placing 
the risk on a defendant.  Plea agreements often contain explicit contingencies 
about sentencing that are tied to a defendant’s criminal record.  For example, a 
plea agreement in the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Alabama provides: 
[T]he Parties understand that if the defendant has three previous convictions 
for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, . . . then the maximum 
statutory punishment that may be imposed for the crime of Felon in Possession 
of a Firearm . . . is: 
a. Imprisonment for not less than 15 years and not more than life; 
b. A fine of not more than $250,000, or; 
c. Both (a) and (b).22 
 
 18. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(C). 
 19. The U.S. Attorney’s Manual hints that such agreements are disfavored: “In order to 
guard against inappropriate restriction of the court’s sentencing options, the plea agreement 
should provide adequate scope for sentencing under all circumstances of the case.”  U.S. DEP’T. 
OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-27.430(B)(3) (1997), available at http://www.jus 
tice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/ [hereinafter U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL].  Note, 
however, that while a PSR is not a mandatory part of sentencing, a defendant may not simply 
waive its preparation.  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 6A1.1(b) (2011).  Instead, the court must 
make a finding that it can meaningfully exercise its authority without one.  Id. § 6A1.1(a)(2); see 
also United States v. Williams, 641 F.3d 758, 765 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 20. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3)(A); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6B1.1(c). 
 21. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6B1.1 cmt. 
 22. Plea Agreement at 2, United States v. Kimble, No. 2:10-102-JHH-RRA (N.D. Ala. July 
22, 2010), 2010 WL 3581142.  A state plea agreement is similarly full of contingencies: 
(a) [I]f I have at least two prior convictions on separate occasions whether in this state, in 
federal court, or elsewhere, of most serious crimes, I may be found to be a Persistent 
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That is, depending on what the PSR reveals about currently existing facts, a 
defendant could be sentenced to life.  In the United States District Court for the 
District of Montana, a plea agreement stated: “The defendant understands that 
Title 21 penalties may be enhanced for prior drug-related felony convictions.  
The defendant states that he has fully consulted with his attorney, and 
understands the potential impact of these enhancements to his sentence.”23  
Here too, the defendant is warned that the sentence may be increased by facts 
which are knowable at the time of the plea, but which have not yet been 
uncovered. 
Such warnings in plea agreements are not merely examples of over 
caution.  Frequently, details of a criminal record not known at the time of a 
plea but included in a PSR create sentencing effects which neither party 
intended or appreciated.  United States v. White is a good example of a 
misunderstanding about a criminal record.24  White pleaded guilty to a crack 
offense, with the understanding that he would be entitled to the safety valve 
reduction below a ten year mandatory minimum “if my criminal history 
qualifies me for safety valve treatment.”25  As the Seventh Circuit explained, 
with the safety valve and “additional reductions for acceptance of 
responsibility and being a minor participant, White could have received a 
sentence as low as forty-six months.”26 
 
Offender.  If I am found to be a Persistent Offender, the Court must impose the mandatory 
sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of early release of any kind.  [If not 
applicable, this paragraph should be stricken and initialed by the defendant and the judge 
__________.] 
(b) The standard sentence range is based on the crime charged and my criminal 
history. . . . 
(c) The prosecuting attorney’s statement of my criminal history is attached to this 
agreement.  Unless I have attached a different statement, I agree that the prosecuting 
attorney’s statement is correct and complete.  If I have attached my own statement, I 
assert that it is correct and complete.  If I am convicted of any additional crimes between 
now and the time I am sentenced, I am obligated to tell the sentencing judge about those 
convictions. 
(d) If I am convicted of any new crimes before sentencing, or if any additional criminal 
history is discovered, both the standard sentence range and the prosecuting attorney’s 
recommendations may increase or a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without 
possibility of parole maybe required by law.  Even so, I cannot change my mind and my 
plea of guilty to this charges binding on me. 
Statement of Def. on Plea of Guilty to Felony Non-Sex Offense, Washington v. Franklin, No. 06-
1-10112-6 SEA (Wash. Super. Ct. Nov. 5, 2007), 2007 WL 4977223 (citation omitted). 
 23. Plea Agreement at 6, United States v. Jaeger, Nos. CR 05-23-BU-DWM, CR 06-03-BU-
DWM, (D. Mont. July 19, 2010), 2010 WL 3182781. 
 24. 597 F.3d 863 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 25. Id. at 865. 
 26. Id. at 866 (quotations omitted). 
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The trial court warned of the mandatory minimum, and “that White’s 
actual sentence would be determined by the court after an investigation by the 
U.S. Probation Office and consideration of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.”27  
The trial judge further emphasized that he was “not going to be able to 
determine the advisory guideline sentence for [White] until after a presentence 
report has been completed.”28  However, the prosecution and defense assumed 
that safety valve relief would be available: “[A]t the plea hearing, the district 
judge asked the government’s counsel if she had reviewed White’s criminal 
history, and she responded in the affirmative.”29 
Unfortunately, the PSR revealed two marijuana misdemeanors, and the 
defendant’s criminal record rendered him ineligible for the safety valve.30  
Even though a “mutual mistake here led both parties to believe that White 
would be eligible for safety valve treatment,” the Seventh Circuit affirmed the 
trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea.31  The court 
noted that “[l]ike the district court, we too sympathize with White.  But had he 
been allowed to withdraw his plea, a subsequent guilty verdict by a jury looks 
here like it would have been a foregone conclusion.”32 
United States v. Horne, a case from the District of Columbia, was similar 
to White.33  Defendant Horne was charged with a crack offense.34  “Both the 
defense counsel and the prosecutor had surmised prior to receiving the 
presentence report that Horne’s prior conviction for possession with intent to 
distribute marijuana was only a misdemeanor in the State of Maryland as it 
would be in the District of Columbia; in fact, however,” it was a felony.35  As a 
result, Horne’s sentencing guideline range was dramatically increased.36  The 
D.C. Circuit affirmed the denial of Horne’s motion to withdraw his plea, 
noting that the trial “court specifically informed Horne that no one—not even 
the judge—could know what sentencing range would apply until the 
presentence report was available.”37 
 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 866 n.2. 
 30. White, 597 F.3d at 866.  The court stated, “[w]e are unclear how the mistake was made, 
but we trust that the government does not go around promising to recommend reductions that it 
knows will not be available.”  Id. at 866 n.2. 
 31. Id. at 867–68. 
 32. Id. at 868; see also, e.g., United States v. Welch, 290 F. App’x 543, 545 (4th Cir. 2008) 
(upholding the district court’s decision to deny defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea).  
But see United States v. Hernandez-Wilson, 186 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1999) (allowing withdraw of 
plea based on erroneous suggestion that defendant would be eligible for safety valve relief). 
 33. 987 F.2d 833 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
 34. Id. at 834. 
 35. Id. at 835. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 837. 
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B. The Case for a Pre-Plea PSR 
The Horne court correctly observed that it was impossible to predict a 
sentence without a PSR, at least in the absence of a stipulation.38  However, the 
unavailability of a PSR is not intrinsic or inevitable—it is the result of custom 
and choice.  The PSR could be available at the time of the plea if it were 
prepared in advance. 
Horne, remarkably, has two opinions for a unanimous panel, each written 
by a different judge, plus a third opinion by Judge Buckley, apparently 
concurring in his other opinion for the panel.39  Judge Buckley, in an opinion 
marked “writing separately for the court,” expressed a “wish to make a 
recommendation concerning the taking of guilty pleas.  Our reason for writing 
separately is to emphasize that our recommendation is just that—a suggestion 
without the force of law.”40  The court further recommended that PSRs be 
prepared and disclosed before the taking of a plea.41  The court’s reasoning 
was straightforward: 
[C]ertain goals of the Rule 11 plea-taking procedures have become more 
difficult to achieve [because of sentencing guidelines].  That rule was designed 
to make sure that a guilty plea is both voluntary and informed.  Yet, while Rule 
11 requires a court to advise the defendant of the “maximum possible penalty 
provided by law” . . . in many federal criminal cases today, this statutory 
maximum is irrelevant. . . . 
. . . . 
  Because the Guidelines have largely replaced the statutes as the 
 determinants of the maximum penalty facing criminal defendants, we 
recommend that, wherever feasible, the district court make their presentence 
reports available to defendants before taking their pleas.  By doing so, 
sentencing judges (and reviewing courts) will have greater confidence that 
pleas are both willing and fully informed.42 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. 987 F.2d at 834. 
 40. Id. at 838 (Buckley, J., writing separately for the court). 
 41. Id. at 839. 
 42. Id. at 838–39.  The court continued: 
  In making this recommendation, we are mindful of the strict resource constraints 
faced by the district court’s probation office and the severe time pressures confronting the 
district judges themselves.  Hence, we do not suggest that defendants have a right to 
peruse their presentence report before pleading.  Nor do we question that, in a given case, 
it may not be feasible to await the completion of a report or that there may be valid 
reasons for withholding the report until after the plea is accepted.  We do no more than 
suggest the desirability of such a practice in the run of cases.  Cf. United States v. Salva, 
902 F.2d 483, 488 (7th Cir.1990) (“We do . . . believe that defendants will be able to 
make more intelligent choices about whether to accept a plea bargain if they have as good 
an idea as possible of the likely Guidelines result.”). 
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Similarly, the Second Circuit has suggested, though not required, that 
sentencing courts43 and prosecutors44 advise defendants about likely sentences. 
The idea that the critical information should be available in advance of the 
plea has much to recommend it.  If the question were a matter of fault rather 
than fairness and accuracy, the legal system could end the matter by applying 
the presumption that all persons know the law.  If the defendant or her lawyer 
has not marshaled the available facts, the risk and consequences of this failure 
would appropriately fall on the defendant.  But in the plea context, the 
Supreme Court has not adopted this emptor approach: “[A] guilty plea ‘not 
only must be voluntary but must be [a] knowing, intelligent ac[t] done with 
sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.’”45  
Thus, due process requires a warning of the maximum sentence, 
notwithstanding the fact that it is available in the U.S. Code to all who care to 
look.  In a system where criminal history may be as significant to the sentence 
as is the particular crime to which the defendant is pleading guilty, there is 
good reason to settle it before the plea. 
While denying that advice is required by the Constitution itself, courts 
recognize that pleading without sentence information implicates the concerns 
of the Due Process Clause.  In United States v. Pimentel, the Second Circuit 
stated that while pleas made without understanding the likely Guideline range 
might be knowing and voluntary, “we are, given our own struggles with the 
Guidelines, not unsympathetic to their claims that they did not fully appreciate 
the consequences of their pleas.”46  The court urged prosecutors to inform 
defendants of sentencing ranges to help “ensure that guilty pleas indeed 
represent intelligent choices by defendants.”47  Similarly, in United States v. 
Horne, the D.C. Circuit stated that presenting a PSR in advance of a plea 
would lead to “greater confidence that pleas are both willing and fully 
informed.”48  Judge Buckley, in a second concurring opinion, added that, 
“Horne’s decision to forego the exercise of a constitutional right was not as 
informed as it could have been, hence not as voluntary as it might have 
 
Id. at 839. 
 43. United States v. Fernandez, 877 F.2d 1138, 1143 (2d Cir. 1989) (suggesting that the 
district court should, but is not legally required, to make “each defendant, at the time of tendering 
a guilty plea . . . fully cognizant of his likely sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines”). 
 44. United States v. Pimentel, 932 F.2d 1029, 1034 (2d Cir. 1991) (suggesting that the 
prosecution “inform defendants, prior to accepting plea agreements, as to the likely range of 
sentences their pleas will authorize under the Guidelines”). 
 45. Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 319 (1983) (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 
742, 748 (1970)). 
 46. 932 F.2d at 1032. 
 47. Id. at 1034. 
 48. 987 F.2d 833, 839 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (Buckley, J., writing separately for the court). 
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been.”49  Under the decision, a defendant “may well be trapped by the formal 
implications of a guilty plea and the failure of the Rule 11 Proceeding to 
provide him with a reliable understanding of its consequences.”50 
One gets the feeling that in their hearts, these judges believed that a plea 
made without any understanding of the likely sentence is not fully knowing, 
voluntary, and intelligent.  However, for some, presumably pragmatic, reason, 
they were unwilling to conclude that due process required a warning even of 
the features of the sentence which were knowable and determinable at the time 
of the plea. 
C. A Pre-Plea PSR Would Not Be Impractical 
Whether required by the Constitution or not, PSRs could be made available 
before a plea. Under Rule 32, a pre-sentence investigation must include an 
interview of the defendant.51  The PSR must calculate the offense level and 
identify the applicable guidelines, the relevant sentencing factors, and the 
grounds for departure.52  The report must also indicate the defendant’s 
“criminal history category” and “the resulting sentencing range and kinds of 
sentences available.”53  In addition, language carried forward from the original 
1944 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires information about the 
defendant’s history and characteristics including criminal record, financial 
condition, and any circumstances relevant to sentencing and “correctional 
treatment.”54  Likewise, the PSR must also contain victim impact and 
restitution information, and “any other information that the court requires.”55  
There is nothing in a PSR that is legally or factually incapable of investigation 
and determination in advance of a guilty plea.  A PSR prepared in advance of a 
plea could be subject to the same sort of objection and correction as exist under 
current practice.56 
There are several practical considerations, none of which are 
insurmountable. 
The Parties Should Do It.  As previously mentioned, in principle, a 
defendant’s criminal history is available to both the prosecution and defense 
without a PSR.  The defendant was presumably present for all of her prior 
convictions and sentences, and the prosecution has access to criminal history 
 
 49. Id. at 840 (Buckley, J., concurring). 
 50. Id. at 841. 
 51. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2). 
 52. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d)(1). 
 53. Id.  See generally FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d)(2)(A)(i) (requiring that a PSR include “any 
prior criminal record”). 
 54. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2) (1946); FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d)(2). 
 55. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d)(2)(F). 
 56. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(f). 
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databases.  Under what Professor Bibas calls the “caveat emptor” approach to 
plea bargaining, the system could leave it to the parties to generate their own 
information.57  Yet, in the actual criminal justice system, the critical analyst of 
criminal record information is neither the prosecution nor the defense—it is the 
probation officer who prepares the PSR.  In the absence of a stipulation 
pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(C), which is part of a plea agreement accepted by the 
court, the PSR’s accounting of a criminal record will ordinarily control, 
particularly over a mistaken view of one or both attorneys.58  For this reason, 
the approach of the Second Circuit in Pimentel is unsatisfactory.  The 
prosecution is encouraged to present its understanding of the guidelines 
calculation before a plea, but it is free to embrace or adopt new or harsher 
recommendations by the Probation Office presented in the PSR.59  Thus, the 
Pimentel approach replaces a complete absence of information about the 
contours of the sentence with unreliable information.  The actual PSR, not an 
imperfect rough draft, should be the basis of a plea. 
In addition, it would be much cheaper to have a criminal history generated 
definitively once (subject to correction by the parties) than to have it generated 
in full three times, once each by the prosecution, defense and probation office. 
Further, both defense attorneys and prosecutors have informational 
disadvantages compared to probation officers.  The prosecution might not 
easily discover out-of-state convictions, old convictions, convictions under an 
alias, or convictions in lower courts.  For its part, the defense might not fully 
understand whether a particular proceeding resulted in a conviction or not, or 
whether particular judgments are misdemeanors or felonies.  Neither 
prosecutors nor defense attorneys are specialists in finding out this 
information, while it is a critical part of probation officers’ jobs. 
Additional Work.  Another issue is the potential additional work involved.  
In the normal run of cases, the argument for preparing some or all of a PSR in 
advance of a plea of guilty is compelling because precisely this work will have 
to be performed at some point anyway.  However, it would, in retrospect, be 
undesirable to have PSRs prepared in the small number of cases that are 
ultimately dismissed or tried to an acquittal. 
To avoid unnecessary reproductions of PSRs, Rule 32 could provide for a 
criminal history calculation or a full PSR in advance of a plea upon the request 
of one or both parties.  The prosecutor and defense attorney will generally have 
solid information on whether there is a reasonable likelihood that a case is 
heading toward dismissal or trial, in which case preparation of a PSR could be 
 
 57. Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market, supra note 1, at 1143. 
 58. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(3)(A) (stating a court “may accept any undisputed portion of 
the presentence report as a finding of fact”). 
 59. See United States v. MacPherson, 590 F.3d 215, 217 (2d Cir. 2009); United States v. 
Habbas, 527 F.3d 266, 270 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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deferred.  Counsel’s belief that a case is heading toward a plea is also likely to 
be reliable.  Of course, the Speedy Trial Act should be amended, if necessary, 
to make clear that time spent waiting for a PSR requested by defense counsel 
in anticipation of a plea is excluded.60 
Nevertheless, if PSRs are prepared before entry of a plea, there will 
inevitably be some number of unnecessary reports generated.  In some cases 
apparently headed toward a plea, a defendant will die before pleading.  In other 
cases, a bargain will fall apart, and the case will be tried or dismissed, although 
neither of those cases renders a PSR necessarily useless.61  But given the 
overwhelming number of cases that plead, the numbers of unnecessary reports 
are likely to be minimal, if not insignificant. 
The earlier preparation of a PSR raises the possibility of another form of 
additional work: updating the PSR in the period between preparation of the 
PSR and imposition of sentence.  Of course, some of this is required now if, 
for example, a defendant is rearrested or there are other material developments.  
However, pre-plea PSRs will shorten the time between plea and sentence.  
Most of the delay is occasioned by waiting for the PSR, so there may not be an 
appreciable lengthening of the period of time not covered by the PSR, and 
therefore, no appreciable information gap to make up at sentencing. 
Frustration of Pleas.  In some cases, the results of a PSR will lead the 
parties to change their bargain, perhaps involving a plea to different charges, if 
the sentence under the original charges is other than what they anticipated, or if 
the actual criminal record makes the original charges unwarranted for some 
reason.  The revised charges could be more or less severe.  A pre-plea PSR 
could improve prosecution decision-making just as it could improve defense 
calculations. 
If an anticipated plea falls apart, more work might be required of the 
probation office to revise the guidelines calculations based on the new charges.  
To the extent that the result is a more just plea agreement, it is probably worth 
the effort.  Some plea bargains will fail when a PSR leads defendants to 
recognize their actual exposure—a case that would have pleaded then turns in 
 
 60. 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (2006).  The Speedy Trial Act provides time limits in an effort to 
“assure a speedy trial.”  Id. § 1361(a).  In addition, the Act currently provides for exclusions from 
the time limit computation, including an exclusion for consideration of a plea agreement.  Id. §§ 
1361(h)(1)(A)–(J). 
 61. A PSR in a case later tried to an acquittal will be useless, but if there is a conviction, the 
PSR could still be updated and used.  In a case where a prosecution is dismissed, the PSR would 
not necessarily have been wasted.  In fact, the criminal history calculation or other information in 
a report could be the basis for an exercise of prosecutorial discretion.  See U.S. ATTORNEYS’ 
MANUAL, supra note 19, § 9-27.220(A)(3) (providing that “adequate non-criminal alternative” 
may be a ground for declining prosecution).  Although from the perspective of the probation 
office this report may seem to be a waste, from the perspective of the criminal justice system as a 
whole, it is more likely seen as a cost-effective piece of information. 
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to a trial case.  This means not only that the PSR could turn out to be a wasted 
effort if the trial results in an acquittal, but also that the early PSR has 
generated the costs of a trial.62  But the PSR could still be used, as revised, if 
necessary, in the event of a conviction, and it can hardly be counted as 
undesirable that defendants reject plea bargains that are unacceptable to them. 
Admissibility of Statements.  There are evidentiary concerns in addition to 
the resource concerns outlined above.  If a case that the prosecutor and defense 
attorney believe is heading toward a plea actually does plead, then no 
evidentiary difficulty would be raised by generating the PSR before rather than 
after the plea agreement.  But if the plea does not go forward for some reason, 
then the PSR contains two sets of statements about which counsel might be 
concerned. 
One category of statements is the victim’s statements relating to the case.  
The defense counsel might be happy to have these statements for use during 
cross-examination at trial, and the prosecutor might wish to prevent the 
availability of such statements.  On the one hand, there is no strong policy 
reason to prevent the generation of these kinds of statements.  A witness with a 
good memory who makes consistent statements will not be impeached, and the 
cause of justice is not harmed by allowing juries to evaluate the credibility of 
other categories of witnesses.  However, the point of pre-plea PSRs is not to 
change the balance between prosecution and defense as it now exists.  To 
avoid a side controversy, it may make sense to extend the evidentiary 
prohibition against admitting pleas and plea bargain discussions to make 
statements of witnesses contained in PSRs inadmissible, even for impeachment 
purposes.63 
This might not completely resolve the situation.  A second category of 
statements which might raise concerns for counsel is statements made by the 
defendant to a probation office.  The defendant enjoys the privilege against 
self-incrimination,64 and statements to a probation officer are admissible only 
if not compelled and voluntarily made.65  A defendant may wish to get credit 
for accepting responsibility and avoid an enhancement for obstruction of 
justice, but may hesitate to speak candidly without the security of an actual 
plea deal in hand.  Extending the protection of Federal Rule of Evidence 410 to 
statements made to probation officers as a part of sentencing, provided that the 
statements cannot be used in other cases or in any sentencing which might 
 
 62. On the other hand, the PSR may well have avoided the cost of an appeal or motion to 
withdraw a plea. 
 63. FED. R. EVID. 410. 
 64. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 65. See United States v. Perez-Franco, 873 F.2d 455, 460–62 (1st Cir. 1989). 
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occur if the contemplated plea bargain fails, would be helpful.66  However, 
prosecutors will justly object to bearing the burden of proving that they made 
no direct or derivative use of the statements.  On the other hand, defense 
counsel will be reluctant to allow statements to be made if they can be used by 
the prosecution for investigative leads.  It may be that this part of the pre-
sentence investigation must be deferred until after the plea.  That would still 
mean that many of the most important parts of the PSR could be completed in 
advance. 
Full PSR or Just Criminal History?  Admittedly, preparation of a full PSR 
before a plea would be a substantial change from the practice in many 
districts.67  A compromise approach might be to prepare only the criminal 
history.  It would correct some of ignorance associated with pleading, while 
avoiding other problems, such as concerns about statements of witnesses or the 
defendant.  Ultimately, preparing only the criminal history would be sub-
optimal, because it would fail to address many questions about the application 
of the Guidelines which could be definitively determined.  Yet, it would 
clearly be better than nothing. 
*** 
There is a final pragmatic reason that under current sentencing systems, 
more information should be provided to the defendant in advance of the plea.  
Under the old system, a person convicted of a serious crime might be subject to 
a sentence of probation, any term of years, or life.68  Thus, when a defendant 
pled guilty and took the risk that their sentence could be on the high end of that 
range, that risk was counterbalanced by the possibility of getting a one day 
sentence or straight probation.  It is one thing to warn a defendant only that 
they face life imprisonment when, should things go their way, they might walk 
out of court that day.  It is another to give a limited warning when there is no 
hope of a low sentence because of a mandatory minimum sentence which is 
applicable under the circumstances, or little hope of a low sentence because 
guidelines recommend many years in prison.69 
 
 66. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.8(a) (2011) (“Where a 
defendant agrees to cooperate with the government by providing information concerning unlawful 
activities of others, and as part of that cooperation agreement the government agrees that self-
incriminating information provided pursuant to the agreement will not be used against the 
defendant, then such information shall not be used in determining the applicable guideline range, 
except to the extent provided in the agreement.”). 
 67. Fennell & Hall, supra note 16, at 1626 (noting that PSRs “generally cannot be submitted 
until the defendant pleads or is found guilty”). 
 68. Id. at 1615 (“[J]udges have virtually unlimited discretion to impose any type and length 
of sentence for a specified offense, within statutory limits.”). 
 69. Cf. United States v. Goins, 51 F.3d 400, 402−05 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting that mandatory 
minimum sentence must be disclosed as part of Rule 11 colloquy). 
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In Boykin v. Alabama, the Supreme Court explained further: “What is at 
stake for an accused facing death or imprisonment demands the utmost 
solicitude of which courts are capable in canvassing the matter with the 
accused to make sure he has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and 
of its consequence.”70  By preparing PSRs in advance of a plea, courts could 
greatly improve the understanding of defendants and prosecutors at little to no 
additional cost and also improve the fairness and legitimacy of the criminal 
justice system. 
II.  COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES AND THE DEFENDANT’S STATUS AFTER 
CONVICTION 
Criminal convictions, particularly felonies, subject a defendant to a wide 
range of collateral consequences relating to employment, public benefits, 
family status, and civil rights beyond the sentence.71  PSRs do not ordinarily 
list collateral consequences of the criminal conviction that will be applicable to 
the defendant.72  To be sure, there is some overlap between collateral 
consequences and information provided as part of the sentencing process.  For 
example, the collateral consequence of firearms ineligibility73 is also a 
condition of probation and supervised release.74  However, there is no 
systematic effort to canvass the restrictions to which a convicted person is 
subject as part of the sentencing process.  This is both a defect and a missed 
opportunity, because the immediate and long-term sentencing goals cannot be 
achieved without an understanding and articulation of the defendant’s changed 
legal status. 
A. The Defendant’s Financial Condition 
The defendant’s future financial and employment prospects are important 
to know before sentencing.  Rule 32 requires a PSR to contain information 
about “the defendant’s financial condition.”75  Financial condition is important 
because there is a sentencing goal “to provide restitution to any victims of the 
 
 70. 395 U.S. 238, 243−44 (1969). 
 71. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND 
DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS (3d. ed. 2004); UNIF. 
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT prefatory note (2010). 
 72. See generally FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d) (describing the information included in PSRs). 
 73. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2006). 
 74. Id. § 3563(b)(8). 
 75. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d)(2)(A)(ii). 
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offense,”76 and because the amount of a fine depends on “the defendant’s 
income, earning capacity and financial resources.”77 
A defendant’s financial condition, ordinarily, is not a static fact, it is 
affected by context.  Other than the wealthy, most people’s “financial 
condition” is determined by their earning capacity more than their assets.78  
Further, even someone with limited assets may be able to pay a fine or 
restitution if their earning capacity is strong.79 
A critical aspect of the context of a defendant’s earning capacity is that the 
conviction dramatically changes the kinds of employment that are open to an 
individual.80  It makes little sense to calculate a defendant’s earning potential 
based on employment settings which are legally prohibited to the defendant or 
on the retention or acquisition of licenses or permits for which a defendant is 
no longer eligible.81  To set a restitution schedule and a fine, then, often 
requires attention to collateral consequences and their effect on a defendant’s 
earning potential. 
The importance of a defendant’s financial status does not end at the time of 
sentencing.  In addition to or in lieu of incarceration, most people convicted of 
felonies will be under the supervision of the criminal justice system in some 
form.  Most people convicted in federal court serve either probation instead of 
prison or supervised release after prison.82  Standard conditions of probation 
 
 76. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(7). 
 77. Id. § 3572(a)(1); see also id. § 3572(b) (providing that “a fine or other monetary penalty” 
should be imposed “only to the extent that such fine or penalty will not impair the ability of the 
defendant to make restitution”). 
 78. Id. § 3572(a)(1); see also United States v. Blackman, 950 F.2d 420, 425 (7th Cir. 1991); 
United States v. Ruth, 946 F.2d 110, 114 (10th Cir. 1991). 
 79. See, e.g., United States v. Castner, 50 F.3d 1267, 1278 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. 
Gresham, 964 F.2d 1426, 1430–31 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Morrison, 938 F.2d 168, 172 
(10th Cir. 1991). 
 80. See Devah Pager, Double Jeopardy: Race, Crime, and Getting a Job, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 
617 (2005). 
 81. Id. at 620–21. 
 82. Probation and supervised release are similar in many ways.  Both are administered by the 
U.S. Probation Service.  The conditions mandated by statute and the sentencing guidelines are, 
for the most part, the same.  Compare U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5B1.3 (2011) 
(“Conditions of Probation”), with U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5D1.3 (“Conditions 
of Supervised Release”).  They are also similar in that the conditions of probation and conditions 
of supervised release are communicated by a probation officer at the time of sentencing.  See 18 
U.S.C. § 3563(d) (“The court shall direct that the probation officer provide the defendant with a 
written statement that sets forth all the conditions to which the sentence is subject, and that is 
sufficiently clear and specific to serve as a guide for the defendant’s conduct and for such 
supervision as is required.”); id. § 3583(f) (“The court shall direct that the probation officer 
provide the defendant with a written statement that sets forth all the conditions to which the term 
of supervised release is subject, and that is sufficiently clear and specific to serve as a guide for 
the defendant’s conduct and for such supervision as is required.”). 
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and supervised release require that a person pay restitution,83 “work regularly 
at a lawful occupation,”84 and “support the defendant’s dependents and meet 
other family responsibilities.”85  Defendants are commonly returned to prison 
for failure to comply with these conditions.  Thus, even if the defendant is able 
to pay any restitution and fine in full upon sentencing, a defendant will 
ordinarily be subject to ongoing financial and employment responsibilities.  A 
defendant’s ongoing financial obligations, imposed as part of the criminal 
judgment, mean a sentencing judge and counsel must understand the 
defendant’s future occupational restrictions at the time of sentencing. 
B. General Compliance with Law 
In addition to financial obligations, probation and supervised release 
require the defendant to be generally law-abiding.  It is a condition of both that 
“[t]he defendant shall not commit another federal, state or local offense.”86  
When the violations are of malum in se criminal prohibitions, a defendant 
should not be heard to complain that she did not know, for example, that it was 
illegal to sell drugs.87  But the legal restrictions on those convicted of crime are 
often little-known, even to lawyers and judges. 
A system aiming for compliance with a complex set of restrictions must 
actually articulate the nature of the behavior for which it is looking.88  Once 
again, the law seems to require this already.89  Conditions of supervised release 
and probation must be “sufficiently clear and specific to serve as a guide for 
the defendant’s conduct.”90  The implication is that if there is a particular set of 
unusual restrictions applicable because of a criminal conviction, it should be 
 
 83. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5B1.3(a)(6); id. § 5D1.3(a)(6). 
 84. Id. § 5B1.3(c)(5); id. § 5D1.3(c)(5). 
 85. Id. § 5B1.3(c)(4); id. § 5D1.3(c)(4). 
 86. Id. § 5B1.3(a)(1); id. § 5D1.3(a)(1). 
 87. United States v. Ortuno-Higareda, 450 F.3d 406, 411 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting United 
States v. Dane, 570 F.2d 840, 843–44 (9th Cir. 1977)), vacated en banc, 479 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 
2007). 
 88. See, e.g., United States v. Gallo, 20 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 1994). 
 89. United States v. Felix, 994 F.2d 550, 552–53 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that a probation 
violation must be supported by fair notice, but failure to serve written statement of conditions as 
required by statute can be cured by providing oral notice); see also United States v. Ortega-Brito, 
311 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting the importance of compliance with 18 U.S.C. § 
3583(f) by emphasizing that “the obligations of the district courts and probation officers under 
those statutes are specific, and we encourage the establishment of procedures that would ensure 
compliance with the letter, as well as the purpose, of the statutes”). 
 90. 18 U.S.C. § 3563(d) (2006); id. § 3583(f); see also United States v. Stanfield, 360 F.3d 
1346, 1354 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Simmons, 343 F.3d 72, 81 (2d Cir. 2003)) 
(“Due process requires that the conditions of supervised release be sufficiently clear to give the 
person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he 
may act accordingly.”). 
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set out in the PSR.  For example, in many states, those on probation or parole 
may not vote, and voting when not authorized to do so can be a criminal 
offense.91  But some states do allow probationers and parolees to vote, and this 
turns out to be something more than a simple question.92 
Like other people, defendants travel and move their residences, so it will 
not always be a simple matter to determine which collateral consequences are 
germane to a particular defendant.  In state systems, it would be reasonable to 
list the collateral consequences applicable in the state.  In the federal system, 
federal consequences plus those applicable in the defendant’s current state of 
residence should be listed. 
CONCLUSION 
The PSR was invented in a time when most cases were decided by trial and 
judges generally imposed discretionary sentences.  It is inadequate for an era 
when most cases are decided by guilty plea, and most sentences are imposed 
by judges with limited discretion.  To the extent that critical ingredients of 
mandatory or discretionary sentences, such as a defendant’s criminal history, 
are legally and factually determinable in advance of a plea, they should be 
determined at that time. 
In addition, current law requires a PSR to describe the defendant’s current 
and prospective financial condition and earning capacity in order to set fines 
and restitution.93  Probation and supervised release documents also require 
sufficient detail about restrictions and obligations so as to “serve as a guide for 
the defendant’s conduct.”94  These goals require clear articulation of the 
collateral consequences to which a defendant will be subject while on 
probation or supervised release. 
  
 
 91. See Ryan S. King, SENTENCING PROJECT, A DECADE OF REFORM: FELONY 
DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES (2006), available at http://www.sentenc 
ingproject.org/doc/publications/fd_decade_reform.pdf. 
 92. See id. 
 93. See supra notes 76–86 and accompanying text. 
 94. 18 U.S.C. 3583(f). 
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